How Did Pre-Fed Banking Panics End?
with Gary B. Gorton
How did pre-Fed banking crises end? How did depositors’ beliefs change? During the National Banking Era, 1863-1914, banks responded to the severe panics by suspending convertibility, that is, they refused to exchange cash for their liabilities (checking accounts). At the start of the suspension period, the private clearing houses cut off bank-specific information. Member banks were legally united into a single entity by the issuance of emergency loan certificates, a joint liability. A new market for certified checks opened, pricing the risk of clearing house failure. Certified checks traded at a discount to cash (a currency premium) in a market that opened during the suspension period. Confidence was restored when the currency premium reached zero.
with Gary B. Gorton
How did pre-Fed banking crises end? How did depositors’ beliefs change? During the National Banking Era, 1863-1914, banks responded to the severe panics by suspending convertibility, that is, they refused to exchange cash for their liabilities (checking accounts). At the start of the suspension period, the private clearing houses cut off bank-specific information. Member banks were legally united into a single entity by the issuance of emergency loan certificates, a joint liability. A new market for certified checks opened, pricing the risk of clearing house failure. Certified checks traded at a discount to cash (a currency premium) in a market that opened during the suspension period. Confidence was restored when the currency premium reached zero.
Too Big to Fail Before the Fed
with Gary B. Gorton
“Too-big-to-fail” is consistent with policies followed by private bank clearing houses during financial crises in the U.S. National Banking Era prior to the existence of the Federal Reserve System. Private bank clearing houses provided emergency lending to member banks during financial crises. This behavior strongly suggests that “too-big-to-fail” is not the problem causing modern crises. Rather it is a reasonable response to the threat posed to large banks by the vulnerability of short-term debt to runs.
with Gary B. Gorton
“Too-big-to-fail” is consistent with policies followed by private bank clearing houses during financial crises in the U.S. National Banking Era prior to the existence of the Federal Reserve System. Private bank clearing houses provided emergency lending to member banks during financial crises. This behavior strongly suggests that “too-big-to-fail” is not the problem causing modern crises. Rather it is a reasonable response to the threat posed to large banks by the vulnerability of short-term debt to runs.
Forecasting Inflation: Phillips Curve Effects on Services Price Measures
Joint with Saeed Zaman
_
We estimate an empirical model of inflation that exploits a Phillips Curve relationship between a measure of unemployment and a sub-aggregate measure of inflation (services). We generate an aggregate inflation forecast from forecasts of the goods sub-component separate from the services sub-component, and compare the aggregated forecast to the leading time-series univariate and standard Phillips curve forecasting models. Our results indicate notable improvements in forecasting accuracy statistics for models that exploit relationships between services inflation and the unemployment rate. In addition, models of services inflation using the short-term unemployment rate (less than 27 weeks) as the real economic indicator display additional modest forecast accuracy improvements.
_
Joint with Saeed Zaman
_
We estimate an empirical model of inflation that exploits a Phillips Curve relationship between a measure of unemployment and a sub-aggregate measure of inflation (services). We generate an aggregate inflation forecast from forecasts of the goods sub-component separate from the services sub-component, and compare the aggregated forecast to the leading time-series univariate and standard Phillips curve forecasting models. Our results indicate notable improvements in forecasting accuracy statistics for models that exploit relationships between services inflation and the unemployment rate. In addition, models of services inflation using the short-term unemployment rate (less than 27 weeks) as the real economic indicator display additional modest forecast accuracy improvements.
_
"Banking and Financial Crises in United States History:
What Guidance Can History Offer Policymakers?" [Version November 28, 2010]
Joint with Elmus R. Wicker, Indiana University.
This paper assesses the validity of comparisons between the current financial crisis and past crises in the United States. We highlight aspects of two National Banking Era crises (the Panic of 1873 and the Panic of 1907) that are relevant for comparison with the Panic of 2008. In 1873, overinvestment in railroad debt and the default of railroad companies on that debt led to the failure of numerous brokerage houses, an antecedent to the modern investment bank. For the Panic of 1907, panic-related deposit withdrawals centered on the less regulated trust companies, which were less directly linked to the existing lender of last resort, similar to investment banks in 2008. The popular press has made numerous references to the banking crises (there were three main ones) of the Great Depression as relevant comparisons to the present crisis. This paper argues that such an analogy is inaccurate in general. Banking crises in US history reflected widespread depositor withdrawals whereas the recent panic arose from counterparty solvency fears. The lessons from the past, therefore, appear less directly relevant for the current crisis.
This paper assesses the validity of comparisons between the current financial crisis and past crises in the United States. We highlight aspects of two National Banking Era crises (the Panic of 1873 and the Panic of 1907) that are relevant for comparison with the Panic of 2008. In 1873, overinvestment in railroad debt and the default of railroad companies on that debt led to the failure of numerous brokerage houses, an antecedent to the modern investment bank. For the Panic of 1907, panic-related deposit withdrawals centered on the less regulated trust companies, which were less directly linked to the existing lender of last resort, similar to investment banks in 2008. The popular press has made numerous references to the banking crises (there were three main ones) of the Great Depression as relevant comparisons to the present crisis. This paper argues that such an analogy is inaccurate in general. Banking crises in US history reflected widespread depositor withdrawals whereas the recent panic arose from counterparty solvency fears. The lessons from the past, therefore, appear less directly relevant for the current crisis.
| tallmanwicker_bfcush_11_28_2010.pdf |